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Podium 1/2000


Tolerance, Acceptance and Mutual Respect - Characteristics in Short Supply in Democratic Societies

by Micha Brumlik

One outcome of the prevailing civil wars in the 15th and 16th centuries was the disempowerment of the Church from an omnipotent power controlling every aspect of life to a religion promoting personal well-being, from a binding, public power to a popular, optional and therefore noncommittal private matter. The formula for the comfortable coexistence and harmony in states that are more or less denominationally neutral is 'tolerance'.

Sometimes with gritted teeth

'Tolerance' appears then to be little more than the ability to accept, albeit sometimes with gritted teeth, the actions and opinions of others, provided these are not expressly forbidden. The problem which this conceals is precisely illustrated in the political-theoretical tract written by the philosopher Baruch de Spinoza, who lived in the Netherlands, a country of predominant cosmopolitan character yet, at that time, not quite as tolerant as today: "As a rule, humans are made in such a way that nothing is more intolerable to them than when opinions which they hold to be true are considered criminal and when that which moves them to lead a pious life vis-à-vis God and humans is considered a transgression. They then reject laws and allow themselves all sorts of liberties vis-à-vis the authorities and they do not consider it disgraceful, indeed they consider it highly honorable, to actively generate resentment against this cause and to instigate as much criminal behavior as possible. Because human nature undoubtedly follows this pattern, laws – channeled via opinions - affect the good rather than the bad ...

Statements on human nature, to which we only have access through the filter of our culture in its scientific, moral and religious refractions, are, as the history of the century with its scientific world philosophy, its social Darwinism and vulgar Marxism milieu theory have proved, subject to a high level of error which is potentially catastrophic. In the field of human nature, like in all forms of science, we have at best fallible, not yet disproved, hypotheses which are more or less concurrent with empirical material.

Self-esteem must be mutual

If Spinoza was right, that there is only one expert in the modern world who can determine what is salutary and what promises happiness: the very individual who is searching for well being and happiness, then there are two, actually present, fundamental instincts which should be respected and cultivated:

The yearning for self-esteem should still be uncontestable, the problems only begin when spiritual and instinctive views claim that humans' self-esteem must be mutual, in other words that the self–esteem with which I expect others to treat me, is also how I treat them. The question as to what extent people are prepared to cooperate and share is equally problematic. It is once again indisputable that humans depend on one another for their survival, but whether they are happy to do so is another matter.

According to the North American philosopher John Dewey it is perhaps not sensible at all to foster such a strong split between human behavior in general and morality in particular:

"There is a peculiar inconsistency" said Dewey in 1922, "in the current idea that morals ought to be social. The introduction of the moral ought into the idea contains an implicit assertion that morals depend upon something apart from social relations. Morals are social. The question of ought, should be, is a question of better and worse in social affairs." If Dewey was right, then the conventional comparison between the selfish being on the one side and the self-restrained, with morals imposed from outside as it were on the other, is without meaning – it is instead the question of the quality of their reciprocal social relationships that is decisive.

Acceptance of the other person

This brings me to my first conclusion: Modern concepts of tolerance, which originated as a reaction against the European wars of religion, relegate moral and religious beliefs to the private domain and demands of individuals that they renounce the generally binding implementation of their deepest beliefs. This sacrifice would seem to be acceptable in so far as individuals could be sure that their beliefs would be respected and they themselves are capable of respecting others' beliefs. They will also respect themselves and others much more easily if they have the chance to co-operate and therefore to voice their point of view in as many areas of life as possible. The following two points arise from these considerations:

First the concept of tolerance has proved to be more demanding than was at first assumed. Tolerance not only includes gritting one's teeth and putting up with other people and their opinions, but rather demands the acceptance if not of the opinion itself, then at least of the other person.

No other option as democracy

Secondly, tolerance requires, as a further prize for the renunciation of the unconditional implementation of one's own claims to well-being and happiness, a guarantee of participation, of the unswerving chance to be able to contribute to the community according to one's own beliefs. The willingness to get involved in the construction, organization and defense of such a community, requires experience of being accepted and recognized as well as fair (because involved) social procedures. On this basis, a democratic culture is made of two components, which mutually support and influence each other: On the one hand a democratic system of law and institutions which rely on a democratic character as a precondition, on the other hand democratic people who, for their part, can only develop in large numbers in democratic societies.

Of course we have no other option. It was John Dewey who left us with the following: "The only cure for the shortcomings of democracy is more democracy."

Index: Podium


Tolerance - Basis for Democratic Interaction
by Florian Wenzel

Tolerance, Acceptance and Mutual Respect
by Micha Brumlik

Portrait
The Anti-Defamation League - A World of Difference Institute

Expert's Commentary
by Krzysztof Stanowski


 





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