Tutzing '99
Dinner Speech
by Prof. Dr. Micha Brumlik
Tolerance, acceptance and mutual respect -
Characteristics in short supply in democratic societies
At the threshold of the third millennium in the Christian calendar,
intolerance and violence seem to have taken on a universally new
form. In the place of the murderous inter-state conflicts which
characterized the first half of this century now drawing to a close,
a pattern, which was thought to have ended over three hundred years
ago in Europe with the Thirty Years War, seems to be recurring:
Politics are being determined by bloody struggles between religious
and political groupings within single state systems. A trail of
horror and hatred stretches from Bosnia and Kosovo over the Caucasus
as far as Afghanistan. Every accurate assessment of the past, whether
in relation to modern China or modern Russia whose inception was
accompanied by unimaginably atrocious civil wars, proves that history's
classification of inter-state wars in the first half of the century
and civil conflicts at the turn of the century does not really apply.
Whether the conflicts in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Rwanda and most
recently in Northern Ireland are to be classified with the new or
the old century must be assessed at a later stage. One outcome of
the prevailing civil wars in the 15th and 16th centuries was the
disempowerment of the Church from an omnipotent power controlling
every aspect of life to a religion promoting personal well-being,
from a binding, public power to a popular, optional and therefore
noncommittal private matter. The formula for the comfortable coexistence
and harmony in states that are more or less denominationally neutral
is 'tolerance'.
'Tolerance' appears then to be little more than the ability to accept,
albeit sometimes with gritted teeth, the actions and opinions of
others, provided these are not expressly forbidden. The problem
which this conceals is precisely illustrated in the political-theoretical
tract written by the philosopher Baruch de Spinoza, who lived in
the Netherlands, a country of predominant cosmopolitan character
yet, at that time, not quite as tolerant as today: "As a rule, humans
are made in such a way that nothing is more intolerable to them
than when opinions which they hold to be true are considered criminal
and when that which moves them to lead a pious life vis-Ý-vis God
and humans is considered a transgression. They then reject laws
and allow themselves all sorts of liberties vis-Ý-vis the authorities
and they do not consider it disgraceful, indeed they consider it
highly honorable, to actively generate resentment against this cause
and to instigate as much criminal behavior as possible. Because
human nature undoubtedly follows this pattern, laws - channeled
via opinions - affect the good rather than the bad ...
As Spinoza remarked at that time, laws which affect opinions do
not serve peace, but are hypocritical and engender conflict. This
view enabled him to come to the following conclusions, back in 1670,
as regards the internal context of tolerance and democracy: "If
loyalty rather than servility is to be given predominance and if
the government maintains a firm grip on the highest form of power
and is not forced into handing it over to agitators, then freedom
of judgement must be preserved and people must be ruled in such
a way that they can live together in harmony, despite obviously
different, indeed conflicting opinions. There can be no doubt that
while this is the best way of governing it also results in the least
abuse of the system for it is the most accurate reflection of human
nature. For all those involved in democratic government, which is
closest to the natural state, commit themselves - as I have demonstrated
- to act by common agreement, but not to judge and think in such
a way."
In a first instance, the concept of tolerance must take legal precedence
over morals and, secondly, it goes hand in hand with the view that
matters of human happiness and well-being can now only be considered
private commitments. No sovereign rules, nor does any higher authority
pass laws on the question of happiness and salvation. There is only
one expert in the modern world who can determine what is salutary
and what promises happiness: the very individual who is searching
for well-being and happiness. The flipside of the modern concept
of tolerance is an increasing weakening of all comprehensive concepts
of what makes a good human life. At the end of this century, a century
of civil wars across the globe and increasing intra-state wars,
we must however ask ourselves if Spinoza was not too optimistic
and if we would be better advised to content ourselves with the
simpler suggestions of his contemporary, the English philosopher
Thomas Hobbes. Like Spinoza, although he believed that the Church
should lose its corruptive power of sanctimony, would have been
satisfied with an absolutist order where rule of law prevailed rather
than a democratic one. That which, in theory, seems so obvious to
us today, that tolerance and democracy are intrinsically linked,
is in fact anything but self-evident. This tension is obvious with
Spinoza, who believed two assumptions - although they may appear
to be contradictory at first glance - about human nature to be true:
On the one hand humans are made in such a way that nothing is more
intolerable to them than when what they consider essential for their
relationship to God and humans is judged as a misdeed, on the other
hand a democratic government would come closest to their nature.
The apparent contradiction then disappears if we assume that human
nature is characterized by respect and recognition on the one hand
and a desire to participate on the other.
Statements on human nature, to which we only have access through
the filter of our culture in its scientific, moral and religious
refractions, are, as the history of the century with its scientific
world philosophy, its social Darwinism and vulgar Marxism milieu
theory have proved, subject to a high level of error which is potentially
catastrophic. In the field of human nature, like in all forms of
science, we have at best fallible, not yet disproved, hypotheses
which are more or less concurrent with empirical material. If Spinoza
was right, there are two, actually present, fundamental instincts
which should be respected and cultivated:
The yearning for self-esteem should still be uncontestable, the
problems only begin when spiritual and instinctive views claim that
humans' self-esteem must be mutual, in other words that the self-esteem
with which I expect others to treat me, is also how I treat them.
The question as to what extent people are prepared to cooperate
and share is equally problematic. It is once again indisputable
that humans depend on one another for their survival, but whether
they are happy to do so is another matter. Should we not, at the
end of this century, admit that Sigmund Freud who wrote the following
in 1930 about unease in culture was indeed right:
"The readily denied fact behind all of this is that the human is
not a gentle being, in need of love, which at most defends itself
if attacked, but rather has a significant tendency towards aggression
in addition to its natural talents. In consequence his neighbor
is not only a possible helper and sexual object, but is also a possibility
for venting his aggression, using his labor without paying, using
him sexually without his consent, taking his belongings, humiliating
him, causing him pain, torturing and killing him." Yet the question
which arises from Freud's both accurate and disturbing portrait,
may be put wrongly. According to the North American philosopher
John Dewey, a contemporary of Freud who harbored a less pessimistic
view of human nature than him, it is perhaps not sensible at all
to foster such a strong split between human behavior in general
and morality in particular:
"There is a peculiar inconsistency" said Dewey in 1922, "in the
current idea that morals ought to be social. The introduction of
the moral "ought" into the idea contains an implicit assertion that
morals depend upon something apart from social relations. Morals
are social. The question of ought, should be, is a question of better
and worse in social affairs." If Dewey was right, then the conventional
comparison between the selfish being on the one side and the self-restrained,
with morals imposed from outside as it were on the other, is without
meaning - it is instead the question of the quality of their reciprocal
social relationships that is decisive.
This brings me to my first conclusion: Modern concepts of tolerance,
which originated as a reaction against the European Wars of Religion,
relegate moral and religious beliefs to the private domain and demands
of individuals that they renounce the generally binding implementation
of their deepest beliefs. This sacrifice would seem to be acceptable
in so far as individuals could be sure that their beliefs would
be respected and they themselves are capable of respecting others'
beliefs. They will also respect themselves and others much more
easily if they have the chance to co-operate and therefore to voice
their point of view in as many areas of life as possible. The following
two points arise from these considerations:
First the concept of tolerance has proved to be more demanding than
was at first assumed: in that respect Spinoza is indeed right rather
than Hobbes. Tolerance not only includes gritting one's teeth and
putting up with other people and their opinions, but rather demands
the acceptance if not of the opinion itself, then at least of the
other person. Secondly, tolerance requires, as a further prize for
the renunciation of the unconditional implementation of one's own
claims to well-being and happiness, a guarantee of participation,
of the unswerving chance to be able to contribute to the community
according to one's own beliefs. The willingness to get involved
in the construction, organization and defense of such a community,
requires experience of being accepted and recognized as well as
fair (because involved) social procedures. On this basis, a democratic
culture is made of two components, which mutually support and influence
each other: On the one hand a democratic system of law and institutions
which rely on a democratic character as a precondition, on the other
hand democratic people who, for their part, can only develop in
large numbers in democratic societies.
The failure of the first German democracy was not only due to difficulties
in foreign and economic policy, nor due to its institutional system,
but primarily because the majority of those very citizens, who eighty
years ago almost to the day founded a republic which they were to
bear in the future, were as suspicious - deep down in their hearts,
mind and feelings - of the democratic process, as they were convinced
of the certainty of their own salvation. Additionally almost all
shared the belief that, ultimately, a few selected experts really
did know better than the masses - among whom they did not, however,
count themselves - what was best for everyone else.
It was certainly not inevitable that the Weimar Republic should
either fail as it did, or lead to National Socialism and the Holocaust.
Yet even if the institutional system of the Weimar Republic had
been more astutely designed and certain historical coincidences
had not occurred, this society would still have had a hard path
before it. Building a democracy without democrats and a republic
made up of republicans only by necessity, that is to say with cool,
almost cynical acceptance, was certain to be more or less doomed.
Democracy and tolerance, as constantly threatened elements of a
democratic culture, can only develop as a sign of a mature tradition
of deeply- rooted affective and intellectual behavior, of behavior
which at some point has become so natural that although it is open
to close examination at any time it does not need to constantly
justify itself. After fourteen years of the unfortunate Weimar Republic,
twelve years of a dictatorship - uniquely evil in world history
- after the passing of fifty years of the Federal Republic, forty
years of the GDR and ten years of reunified Germany, this is more
or less still the case in twentieth century Germany. Certainly,
a glance at the east German states, where it is presently a case
not of the emergence of intolerant, racist and xenophobic youth
culture but rather of its reinforcement, demonstrates exactly how
fragile the mass implementation of democracy and tolerance even
under such conditions is. Ten years of a reunified Germany have
evidently not been sufficient to remove the social, psychological
and moral scars left on some four generations by nearly fifty years
of life under a dictatorship.
Of course we have no other option. It was John Dewey who left us
with the following: "The only cure for the shortcomings of democracy
is more democracy."
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Conference in Tutzing
Dinner speach by
Micha Brumlik
Day of Tolerance in Munich
Contributions by:
Christian Ude
Michel Friedman
Cem Özdemir
Thomas Henschel
Julian Nida-Rümelin
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